Thursday, November 18, 2010

Voluntary Slavery

Mill famously argues in Chapter V of On Liberty that a contract of voluntary slavery should be null and void. For Mill, we have no right to surrender our liberty. He argues "But by selling himself for a slave, he abdicates his libverty; he forgoes any future use of it beyond the single act. He therefore defeats, in his own case, the very purpose which is justification of allowing him to dispose of himself"(101). Is Mill correct? Why can't I surrender my liberty? If Mill is correct, how might this argument be applied to other cases? For example, can a democracy vote a government to power that promises to forever suspend a democratic vote?

Wednesday, November 17, 2010

"No Man is an Island"

Mill entertains the following objection in Chapter IV:

The distinction here pointed out between the part of a person's life which concerns only himself and that which concerns others, many persons will refuse to admit . . . No person is an entirely isolated being; it is impossibe for a person to do anything seriously or permanently hurtful to himslef without mischief reaching at least to his near connections and often far beyond them (78).

What is the objection he is considering? How does it undermine his position or argument? What is his response? What should his response be? Is there a response?

Monday, November 15, 2010

Free Speech v. Terrorism

Federal law prohibits material support for terrorist in the form of "training," "expert advice or assistance," "service," and "personnel." Human rights activists, however, have sought to train militant terrorist groups to use international law to resolve disputes. Although these groups do not advocate violence, their aid to terrorists violates federal law. This year in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,the Supreme Court ruled in a 6 - 3 decision that the U.S. government has a compelling interest in preventing terrorism that outweighs the human rights groups' free speech rights. Is this ruling correct? Should such information and training be suppressed? How direct a harm is it to society? What would Mill say about this ruling?

Sunday, November 14, 2010

Plato v. Mill: The Democratic Citizen

For Mill, only in a liberal state can a person fully develop capacities for thinking and deliberation. Only when citizens have the opportunity for choice do they develop into true thinkers and moral agents. For Plato, the democratic individual is free to pursue whatever he wants -- but that is the problem. Following his or her whims, free to pursue any activity regardless of his abilities, the democratic citizen is destined for unhappiness and lost potential. Who is right? What could either point toward in our American society as evidence for his point?

Wednesday, November 10, 2010

Pamphilus Has the Last Word

Pamphilus concludes at the end of the Dialogues, "Philo's principles are more probable than Demea's, but those of Cleanthes approach still nearer to the truth" (89). What are we to make of this observation? Is this supposed to be the judgment of Hume? Is this supposed to be ironic in some way? Does this statement tell us anything about the arguments -- or more about Pamphilus?

Friday, November 5, 2010

Evil? No Problem

In sections X and Xi, Philo and Demea catalogue human misery and Philo uses this evidence to prove that either God does NOT exist or He is NOT benevolent. Is this argument sound? If not, where does the argument fail? What about the possibility that suffering is part of some great good like free will or character development (a theodicy)?

Wednesday, November 3, 2010

Principle of Sufficient Reason: No Brute Facts?

You are hiking in a remote wilderness, miles from the nearest building or even cell phone tower. You come upon a clearing and see a crystal sphere hovering over you and emitting colorful light pulses in some seeming order: red, blue, green and the pattern repeats. Should there be an explanation for this odd phenomenon or is it acceptable to shrug our shoulders and mutter "Stuff happens"? Can we extrapolate from this case to a general principle of the universe? If so, can we prove that God (or a reasonable facsimile) exists?

Tuesday, November 2, 2010

The Relevance of the Origin of Species

One important scientific development unavailable to David Hume or any of his fictional interlocutors is the theory of evolution. For many people today, both theists and atheists, religious believers, scientists and intellectuals, the truth of evolution is bound up with the truth of theism. So what is the significance of evolution for the design argument? Does is it provide evidence for either side of the debate? On this 151st anniversary of the publication of Darwin's seminal Origin of Species, it is fitting to ask: where might a discussion of Darwin have fit into Hume's Dialogues?

Friday, October 29, 2010

Analogies and Disanologies

Cleanthes argues that the universe is like a machine and hence likely designed by intelligent creator. Philo, on the other hand, proposes that it is equally probable that the universe is like an animal or vegetable and the order in the universe may be the result of generation, vegitation, or instinct. He even suggests that chance could produce our universe. Who is right? Given the order and seeming purpose to the universe, what is the most likely explanation? Or are none of them more likely than the other (and hence agnosticism the only rational position)?

Tuesday, October 19, 2010

Macbeth's Dagger and Other Illusions

Hylas objects to Philonous' idealism by claiming that on his view there is no way to distinguish between veridical appearances and illusions. In other words, idealism implies that the danger than Macbeth sees before his eyes but cannot clutch is just as real as the dagger he uses to kill Duncan. Is this a valid objection? How successful is Philonous' response?

Monday, October 18, 2010

Who Needs God?

Berkeley argues that, given the truth of idealism, God must exist. Is he correct? If so, how valuable is this argument? Does this argument give theists anything to cheer about? Or can we get something less than the omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent God that Berkeley believes in?

Much Ado About a Mite

Berkeley argues for his idealism from the relativity of perception. He compares the size of a mite's foot as seen by the mite itself, by a human and by some smaller microorganism. What, exactly, is the argument? Is the argument successful? If not, how do we resist the sucking of all so-called primary qualities into the mind?

Tuesday, October 12, 2010

A Noble Failure?

Many of us in class found Descartes' foundational project to fail. Let's assume that he cannot justify all his claims to knowledge by an appeal to the Cogito. What can we learn from this failure? Should we look for a wider class of foundational beliefs? Should we avoid appeals to a God who is not a deceiver? Should we find a different way to justify beliefs that does not require an appeal to foundational beliefs?

The Role of God

Descartes attemtps to prove God's existence in Meditation III in order to rule out the possibility of an evil genius and to ensure that everything he clearly and distinctly perceives to be true is in fact true. Without discussing the merits of the argument (which we only summarized in class), discuss the role of the existence of God in Descartes' project. Assuming he can prove God's existence, can God guarantee the truth of clear and distinct ideas? Can God guarantee sense perception? Is it wise that God plays such a prominent role in his porject?

Monday, October 4, 2010

The Cogito

In Meditation II, Descartes believes he has both defeated skepticism and discovered a foundational belief that he will use to justify all his other claims to knowledge. He argues that the very act of doubt proves that he exists. Is he right? Does the Cogito disprove skepticism? Even if it does is it a Pyrrhic victory -- or can this belief be the basis for the rest of his knowledge?

When the Walls Come Tumbling Down

Descartes realizes that some of the beliefs he thought were true turned out to be false. In the pursuit of knowledge he seeks to tear down his previous beliefs and build them up again upon a firm foundation. In other words, he is engaged in a foundational project, searching for a class of beliefs that themselves are not in need of justification in order to justify his other beliefs. But is this quest a misguided one? Do such beliefs exist? If not, does that mean that knowledge is impossible? Or is there some other way to justify our beliefs?

Thursday, September 16, 2010

Plato's Cave

Plato argues that most of us are like prisoners in a cave who are bound in such a way that we can only see shadows of objects projected on a wall. Not only can we not see the objects that cast the shadows, we cannot even see the objects outside of the cave. A more modern analogy might have the prisoner's watching a movie or perhaps "plugged in" to a virtual reality program. What is Plato claiming about the ordinary person? What is our epistemic state? Do we have any hope in escaping? And most importantly, is Plato correct? In short, what is your interpretation of Plato's allegory of the cave and is the allegory the correct way to view the human quest for knowledge?

Monday, September 13, 2010

Expertise or Popularity?

Plato criticizes democracy throughout The Republic. In Chapter 8, for example, he compares the state to a ship. He argues that it is better to have a captain knowledgeable about navigation steer the ship rather than untrained crewmembers. The crewmembers may be able to persuade the owners to let them sail the ship, but without the proper expertise, the ship will not reach its destination. In other words, Plato argues that democracy rewards popularity over expertise, but it is expertise that is essentail for good government. Is he right? Consider some examples from class. Can democracy deal with such long-term issues as global warming when most people would prefer to ignore them? Can it deal with economic recovery when most citizens don't understand economic theory? Or can you give a point in democracy's favor?

Wednesday, September 1, 2010

A Noble Lie?

In Chapter 5 of the Republic Socrates proposes that his ideal society propagate a "noble lie." Such a lie falsely attributes a precious metal to the constitution of citizens to justify their placement in a given class, thus avoiding any resentment about one's social status.

Are such "noble lies" or myths ever justified? Even if they are the only or best way to preserve some social good (like stability or peace among the classes)? Will such lies eventually be discovered? Are there any such lies propagated today?

The Challenge of the Ring of Gyges

In Chapter 2 of the The Republic Glaucon, the brother of Plato, challenged Socrates to provide a reason to act morally even when immorality appeared more profitable. He related the story of the ring of Gyges, a ring which gives the wearer invisibility and hence preserves his (or her ) anonymity in committing the most egregious of crimes. Such a person may maintain his reputation for good while stealing, pillaging and seducing at will.

Is such a challenge asking too much? Is the only way to provide a valid reason to act morally an appeal to virtue as its own reward, without any consideration of the external benefits? Is it enough that morality is more profitable than immorality MOST of the time, even if not in the wildly implausible thought experiment of the Ring of Gyges?